ANew York Times New York, New York, Tuesday, July 18, 1972 - Page 21
Spassky Appears Weak on Opening by Al Horowitz
Reykjavik, Iceland, July 17—The two games played thus far in the world championship chess match have disclosed that Boris Spassky, the champion, seems to be lacking in knowledge of the openings.
In both games, the American challenger, Bobby Fischer, by playing an unusual defense, stole the initiative in the first few moves and was not punished for it. In fact, after about a dozen moves, Fischer was in command in the first game, a Tarrasch Defense.
In the third game (the second was forfeited by Fischer because he boycotted it), the Benoni Defense gave Fischer an immediate plus. During the game one of Spassky's pawns became vulnerable and fell.
After a few moves it became evident that Spassky had no counterpattern of his own. In many cases, without too much effort, Fischer obtained the better game and in fact gained a pawn and the initiative.
The one special move that is a credit to Fischer was 11. … N-R4. Almost everybody at hand thought it out of place, because a knight on the edge of the board is usually felt to be in an ineffective position. In playing his knight there, Fischer invited its capture, an invitation that Spassky accepted. Spassky thereby permitted Fischer to make use of the white squares commanded by the lost bishop. The absence of the white bishop was felt later.
To a man, the audience considered the game hopeless for Spassky when the 41st move was sealed by Fischer. Svetozar Gligoric, a many-time Yugoslav champion, announced that Spassky's position was hopeless, that Fischer's sealed move would turn out to be B-Q6ch and that the game would then be over. He was right on all counts.
When the game resumed today Spassky could not continue; his position was futile.
The first game began with 1. P-Q4, a staid queen-pawn opening that eventually reverted to the Tarrasch Defense. Clearly, Spassky preferred a positional game.
The Tarrasch—named for Siegbert Tarrasch, a grandmaster, theorist and writer who died in 1934—arises after 1. P-Q4 P-Q4; 2. P-QB4 P-K3; 3. N-QB3 P-QB4. It offers black freedom for his pieces. Its drawback is that black in most cases must acquiesce in the isolation of his queen pawn. This is why the defense had been unpopular.
Lately, however, interest has been reviving as fresh examination has shown that white's task is anything but simple. Thus, even grandmasters like Mikhail Tal and Paul Keres have been experimenting with it.
This particular game developed along general principles without each side's showing any advantage. Moreover, Fischer must have been following his instincts, for he played 29. … BxKRP, seizing a pawn left en prise.
It is still difficult to say whether his judgment was correct.
In the long run Fischer was bound to obtain a second pawn for a bishop he was apt to lose. This would have meant obtaining winning chances if he conducted the end game precisely. Two pawns often defeat a bishop in an end game.
Spassky had considered the idea correctly and he, too, obtained winning chances for whatever Fischer would sacrifice.
The game really began with black's 29th move. The rest was really to confirm or deny the validity of the technique involved in this one play, and Fischer's end could not be held up.
The sacrifice of the bishop, which most fairly strong players consider a blunder, was not a blunder at all. It was based on relatively sound chess appraisals.
But what followed now was inaccurate play that made it look like a blunder. Most strong players here believed Fischer blundered away chances for a draw and fell down in his technique at the last moment. ([A good reason to demand removal of disruptive camera men, which Fischer reported were both audible and visible and a distraction.])
Thus Spassky gained a point not through any great combination but through an error that Fischer made after the sacrifice of the bishop.
